I: Niger In Crisis
The Sahel region of West Africa has homed a striking shift of leadership and policy in the last three years. Niger’s July 26th coup added another nation to what has been come to be known as the ‘coup belt’, a chain of military revolts that displaced leaders domestically viewed as Western, particularly French, puppets. The Niger coup has already been outdated by that of Gabon, displaying the severity and rapid pace of the regional disruption.
However, the circumstances created by the Niger coup which ousted Mohamad Bazoum present much larger challenges to the country’s former coloniser, France and her allies in Washington and Brussels. Under the former Bazoum, France and the US invested heavily in the training of Nigerien forces which they utilised to protect their interests inside the country. For the US, this is in the form of a drone base outside Niamey operated by the United States Africa Command (AFCON) - this base has been vital in the US operations against Boko Haram and other insurgents in Niger, Mali, Nigeria and Chad. French interests threatened in the Niger crisis are severely more dire. Besides the French corporations enjoying tax exemptions and unregulated markets, Niger also provides roughly 15% of France’s Uranium needs at sub-market prices; a vital resource for France’s heavily Nuclear dependant energy network. France also operates a military base in the country which houses more than 1,100 troops. France has already withdrew most of their forces under heavy pressure from the Nigerien government. Niger is indispensable to French foreign policy. Along with Senegal, it represents the stability of the French political and monetary control in the Sahel.
The deposed Mr Bazoum was elected as the 10th President of Niger on 2nd April 2021, the ousted leader is of an ethnic Libyan-Arab tribal background, a fractional minority in Niger . His removal was lead by the head of the presidential guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani - an ex-UN peacekeeper, trained at the National Defence University (NDU) in Washington D.C by the US Army. Gen Tchiani’s officers cite a deteriorating security situation and stagnant economic growth for the removal of Bazoum. Following his overhaul, large crowds gathered in Niamey to support the military junta, the crowds carrying Nigerien and Russian flags swiftly turned their focus to the uneasy French presence.
Washington, Paris and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) attacked the newly positioned junta in Niamey, while neighbouring Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali moved to voice their support. Mali and Burkina Faso are both graduates of the ‘coup belt’, in 2021 and 2022 respectively. Both military governments have followed a diet of strict Francophobic policy, gradually cutting ties with Paris and instead inviting in China and the Russian paramilitary group, Wagner. The latter has been particularly active in Mali, where insurgents attacks have sharply increased.
As Niger also shifts away from the Francafrique, it is expected they will seek assistance from Wagner, should Paris or ECOWAS decide to intervene militarily. Washington’s reaction to the crisis has thus far been timid and lacking any initiative however Niger utilising Wagner could provoke a harsher response from the US.
Almost two months since the coup in Niger, developments between Paris and Niamey unfold daily - the trajectory of the crisis is uncertain and has caused angst in the region. The following timeline records the notable events since the beginning of the coup.
26th July - Gen. Tchiani leads his coup against Mohamad Bazoum. France’s failure in overturning the coup during its early hours ultimately marks its success. Niger’s borders are closed due to possible military intervention.
29th July - France and the EU each make their statements regarding the Niger coup, and withdraw their humanitarian aid.
30th July - ECOWAS meets in Nigeria and gives a 7 day ultimatum to the coup leaders in Niamey to reinstate Bazoum; the bloc also sanctions Niger and halts trade with the country. Protestors in Niamey attack the French embassy and set ablaze the building entrance before security forces disperse the crowds.
3rd - 4th August - Coup leaders revoke military cooperation contracts with France and ECOWAS begins drafting plans for military intervention: Nigeria, Senegal and Ivory Coast show willingness to deploy troops.
6th August - The ECOWAS ultimatum deadline passes, Niger closes its airspace in anticipation of an attack that never came. Thousands of supporters fill the Niamey stadium waving Nigerien and Russian flags.
10th August - ECOWAS activates its standby force to intimidate Niamey however to no affect.
24th September - French President Macron announces French ambassador to Niger will leave the country and French troops will withdraw completely before the end of the year.
27th September - Sylvain Itte, French ambassador to Niger returns to France.
09 October - French troops begin withdrawal from Niger.
The outcome and consequences of Niger’s coup will set a precedent for the Sahel in what to expect should they revolt French homogony. Whilst the governments in the likes of Senegal and Chad are stubbornly aligned with France and its interests, their populations are growing sceptic of the Franco influence. France finds the African crisis burning its foreign policy during a period of intense domestic turmoil. The pensions, police brutality and climate protests have rocked the French economy.
II: French Monetary Imperialism Through the CFA Franc
Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso’s mutiny against France stems from her decades old exploitation following ‘independence’. Many West Africans see the 1960s cooperation agreements as France selling them the responsibility to develop and progress, without handing over the tools to achieve this; France continues to hold onto their lucrative monetary and military perks.
Almost half of modern African states were occupied by Imperial France, the concentration of the colonisation happening in the West of the continent along the Sahel region and north of it into Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Apart from Guinea, the remaining Sahel countries, including Niger, all achieved independence from France in 1960.
However France’s colonial presence remained high in the region. As World War II drew to a close, the two emerging superpowers, the US and Soviet Union were firmly anti-imperial. General Charles de Gaulle of France realised the impeding collapse of the colonies, in response he drew up plans to ensure French interests continue to prevail, part of which was the creation of the Communauté Financière Africaine Franc (CFA Franc). The currency was split between the Central African CFA Franc (XAF) and the West African CFA Franc (XOF). France declared the currency a tool of integration with its former colonies and an aid to support their economies by pegging it to the French Franc initially and then the Euro in 2002.
In the 1960s once full independence had been achieved, the CFA Franc (XOF) was reissued in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) which consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The CFA Franc was established with four principles:
A fixed exchange rate, currently EUR 1=CFA Franc 655.957.
Unlimited convertibility of CFA Francs into Euros.
The centralisation of the foreign exchange reserves of the nations which use the currency, the introduction of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). 50% of BCEAO foreign exchange reserves must be kept in the French Treasury inside an Operating Account.
Free capital transfer within the Franc zone.
The CFA Franc introduces some benefits to the WAEMU, most importantly, it marginally tames inflation, since the currency is pegged to the Euro. This has shielded many West African states from the hyperinflation that has consumed Southern African nations like Zimbabwe, which recorded an inflation rate of 785% during the peak of the Covid Pandemic in 2020. Low inflation means stable domestic prices and increased affordability for imported products; these factors make it less likely civil unrest will occur due to increased consumer prices from hyperinflation.
However the continued use of the CFA Franc has been seen as a colonial harbour in Sahel states. In 2015, the late Idriss Deby, then president of Chad, critically attacked the French involvement in African politics and economics through the means of the CFA Franc:
“We must have the courage to say there is a cord preventing development in Africa that must be severed”
The inflation shielding affects of the CFA Franc may protect consumer prices , however they guarantee uncompetitive markets and domestically produced goods. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the Sahel region is a trickle, artificially high exchange rates make investment unattractive since returns will always be shadowed by the pegged rate. Furthermore, goods produced domestically are priced out of the global markets compared to the value available from weaker currencies of other developing economies. In an attempt to adjust this in 1994, the CFA Franc was devalued by 50% however a weak macroeconomic setup dimmed the benefits of the manoeuvre. Domestic producers were forced to import raw materials at double the original price and sell at half.
Furthermore, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the only authority which dictates the monetary policy and exchange rate of the CFA Franc. The ECB represents a union of developed or largely developed markets, thus its primary goal is to curb inflation - historically any monetary policy that focusses on inflation will stagnate growth since they oppose each other. An opinion piece written in the London School of Economics’ Review of African Political Economy highlights the affects of the CFA Franc in the Sahel as
“…synonymous with poverty and under-employment, as evidenced by the fact that 11 of its 15 adherents are classed as Least Developed Countries (LDCs), while the remainder (Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon) have all experienced real-term economic decline”.
However the most scandalous of the four CFA Franc pillars is the requirement for 50% of foreign reserves to be placed in special operational accounts within the French Central Bank (FCB). In reality, this number is around 70% since France charges member states a further 20% for financial liabilities. The state funds that are placed in the FCB are available to invest and profit from, member states don’t receive a return from any gains. More outstandingly, France will charge member states interest if their special operational accounts are in debit.
Besides the CFA Franc, France utilises cheap labour from member states, exports products at no fee, and has her multi-national conglomerates operate tax-free internally. The financial exploitation of CFA Franc member states by France is so vast, it would require substantially more analysis to begin scratching the surface of it.
III: Anti-French Sentiment in the Sahel
24th May 2021, a mutiny in the Malian Army leads a coup d’état against President Bah N’daw, who had gained powered through another coup d’état less than a year prior. 5th September 2021, the head of Guinea’s special forces televises a statement announcing the dissolution of the country’s government and constitution. 23rd January 2022, a swift firefight in Burkina Faso leads to another coup. The coup tide rides through ex-French colonies and its momentum only keeps gaining.
In Burkina Faso’s capital, the French embassy was attacked on October 2022, an event that was repeated in Niamey, Niger following the coup. In Dakar, Senegal, French retailers were the target of ransacking. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Guinea have all seen large scale protests for the withdrawal of French troops from their territories and have called on their governments to reduce their involvement with the French financially, politically and militarily. In March 2021, the Senegalese government, a strong Western ally , responded to such protests in Dakar with brute force, resulting in four days of rioting across the capital and 15 deaths. The Dakar protests were in the response to the arrest of the ‘democratic’ government’s opposition, Ousmane Sonko, a harsh critic of foreign exploitation in Senegal.
The erosion of France’s colonial legacy is propagating across the continent through more than just civil unrest. In June, Mali voted to drop French as an official language, following the lead of Algeria which has been bolstering the national use of English over French. In 2022, Burkina Faso removed the broadcast of French radio in the country. In the meantime, Mali banned French NGOs from domestic operations and recently stopped issuing Visas to French nationals through its Paris embassy. The largest combined tactical effort against France came on 7th August when Burkina Faso and Niger terminated tax exemption treaties which previously allowed French companies to operate in the country without paying corporation tax.
The Sahel’s independence in 1960 was French colonialism going incognito, neo-colonialism. France positioned Francophiles in the newly independent territories and punished those who strayed i.e. Sylvanus Épiphanio Olympio of Togo or Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea. In the 63 years since independence, the population of the Sahel has grown poorer, relied heavier on foreign aid, and struggled more with insurgencies; so very little to show for the empty words of foreign entities and their political allies domestically. France washes its hands of these failures and references the independence of these countries. The Francophiles will fail to mention the infantilisation of African governments by controlling their monetary policies and filling their ministries with French diplomats.
Of course France is not the only colonial power to pillage Africa, but unlike the rest, they have prolonged their efforts to exploit and made their ambitions so evident. Western powers have been struggling with the growing influence of Russia and China in Sub-Saharan Africa but have done little to prove they can offer more value. Russia’s Wagner has repeatedly proven effective in combatting Islamic militants, especially in Mali and the Central African Republic. China and Türkiye have pumped billions of dollars across Africa in infrastructure projects that pop-up spontaneously. Russia and China have their own agendas within Africa, but their influence, especially that of Wagner is often exaggerated compared to that of European powers.
Any future which includes a developed Sub-Saharan Africa will be preluded by the actual independence of their governmental policy, without the constraints of European influence or interests. No doubt there will be mistakes made, it is likely there will be major suffering and/or conflict. However, the European continent only achieved their current status through several major wars, trial and error, and the development of a societal experience which guided their future endeavours. To continue infantilising the African governance process is to prolong their suffering and dependence on institutions that have different interests.
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